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inspects the alternative pleading problem in so many words and therefore
doesn't decisively state the conclusion which tacitly results from the
decision tends to weaken the case as a final solution of that problem.
There is even a slight possibility that the case might be held to establish
a principle requiring an election of pleas rather than alternative pleading
but the wording of the decision would seem to indicate that the court
would have decided in favor of the alternative pleading theory had it
looked the problem squarely in the face. R.L.B.
TRUSTS
TRUSTS - THE OHIO TRUST INVESTMENT STATUTE
The problem of investment in these days of wars, economic de-
pressions, unemployment, and inflation are very real and very present.
The questions of relative security of principal, amount and permanence
of income are considered every day by all classes of investors. The invest-
ing public must be constantly alert to activities in all parts of the nation
and the world which affect the great securities markets. A great silver
shipment from India or China, or a change in the foreign policy of
some distant nation, may, and often does affect the trends of stock,
bond and commodity markets. The "blue chip" of today may be the
"dog on the market" of tomorrow. All these factors and many more
must be reckoned with by the usually careful but poorly informed in-
vesting public. Difficult as the position of the ordinary prudent investor
may be, the position of a trustee, in placing the funds and property in his
care in such manner as to ensure the beneficiaries an adequate income
and at the same time safeguard the principal, is one infinitely more
difficult and precarious. In order to aid the trustee in this matter and
at the same time provide him with some protection, legislatures of many
states have enacted statutes governing types of investments and prescrib-
ing the outer limits as to conduct and discretion.'
These statutes have been of two different types,2 mandatory and
permissive. The mandatory statutes expressly limit the trustee in invest-
ing to the types of securities set out.' Any deviation from this list con-
stitutes a breach of trust. The permissive statute4 is the more usual
treatment and also sets forth categories of permissible investments for a
'See former section Oseo G.c. IZ14. And the present section oSo6-4i.2 Legal Lists in Trust Investment, 49 YALE L.J. 891 (1940) sets out instances of
mandatory and permissive statutes, pages 895-goo.
a See for example IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933 Code Book sec. iS-12o4). "Shall
invest . . . but no other . . . "
'"The trustees may invest . . . ." The Ohio statute o5o6-4i and the former
statute 1214 are also permissive in form.
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trustee. The effect of these permissive statutes is to afford the trustee
some measure of protection if he invests within the legal list, but if they
go beyond these categories, then the securities must be judged on their
own merits.5 It is submitted that the purpose of the legislatures when
enacting these statutes was two-fold, to set a guide for and to afford
some protection to the trustee, and not to act as an investment counselor.
The present Ohio statute' is permissive in form as was the former
statute.' The permissive nature of the former provision was expressly
recognized by the Ohio Supreme Court in Willis Adm'r v. Braucher,
Guardian.' In his opinion Spear, J., said: "It is perhaps enough to say
of this statute that it is permissive? It provides for situations where
the instrument constituting the trust does not otherwise provide. Un-
doubedly it indicates a general policy: a policy of carefulness in the
handling of trust funds; it points out a course free from risk, and affords
a sure method by which the trustee may secure an affirmation of the
legality of his investment in advance."' The court in that case,
expressly recognizing the difficulties of investing, refused to surcharge
a trustee who invested in bank stock, so long as the truste exercised his
discretion in ascertaining the value of the stock, acting in honest belief
and good faith, and upon the advice of business men of sound judgment
who knew the market value of the stocks.
For cases involving a more strict approach in Ohio, an inferior Ohio
Court has held that a trustee may not invest in stocks." An Ohio
Appellate Court has stated that the purchase of stocks by a trustee is
contrary to Section 11214, but in that case the purchase was also
contrary to the terms of the will."
Until the recent case Home Savings and Loan Co. v. Strain et al,
Trustees," it has been generally assumed on the authority of the
Braucher case that the Ohio investment statute belonged in the per-
missive class. In the Strain case, the Supreme Court stated that the
provisions of Ohio G.C. sec. 11214 were mandatory; that the authority
of the testamentary trustee extends only to the categories of securities
'1 Re Cook's Est., zo Del. Ch. 123, 171 Atl. 730 (1934). Also see Wilmington
Trust Co., ct al. v. Worth ct al., 19 Del. Ch. 314, 167 Atl. 848 (1933). " . . . such
,tatutzC are said to create a 'protective haven' for the trustees." 49 YALE L.J. 891 at S9 8.
' Omo o.c. scc. xo5o6-41. " .. . may invest them in the followingi"
7Former Onto G.C. sec. iizx4 . " . . . may invest . . .8 79 Ohio St. 290, 87 N.E. i8g, 55 L.R.A. (N.S.) 273 (1909). Also see 40 OHIo
JuR1r'RUDLNcr, TR rS seC. 147 page 383, see. 148 page 384 vhere the permissive nature
of OHIxo G.e. sec. 11214 is recognized.
'Italics added.
15 Willis v. Braucher, supra, note S.
a Guthrie v. Cincinnati Gas and Electric Co., 2 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 117, 15 Ohio
Dec. 23, citing King v. Talbot, 40 N.Y. 76 (1869).
'Itn Re Trusteeship of Couden, 9 Ohio App. 207 (1917).
1. i3o Ohio St. 53, 3 Ohio Op. 104, IS Ohio L. Abs. 6o, 99 A.L.R. 903 (1935).
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listed in the statute unless the will creating the trust confers greater
powers on the trustee, or unless the trustee has received approval of
the court to invest in non-legals. The Court answered the defendant's
contention that the statute is permissive with a quotation from the final
clause of the statute, ".... or in such other securities as the court having
control of the administration of the trust approves."' 4 and infers that
this qualifies the "may invest" permissive phrase in the statute. It is
submitted that this is simply not so; that this clause does not qualify the
permissive nature of the statute, but is merely an additional means by
which the trustee may obtain that degree of protection which the list
itself affords. We must always return to the basic and fundamental
purpose of this statute which was to afford some guides to the trustee,
and if followed, some degree of protection.
The Court distinguished the Braucher case on the basis of dis-
cretion granted the trustee in the will. This is a valid though legalistic
distinction. It is suggested that the true distinction is that even though
the Court felt in the Braucher case that a trustee could purchase bank
stock and not violate the standards of prudence and good faith, this
could not be done in the speculative days of 1928. If this distinction be
the true one, the Court recognized the tremendous changes in types
and relative risks in investments which took place between i904 and
1928. Thus it would follow that a purchase of bank stock by a trustee
in the year 1928 could not come within the class of prudent trust in-
vestments, and the purchase would be a breach of trust in itself. In sup-
port of this theory the Court said: "The rule adopted in the majority
of jurisdictions is that in the absence of express authority granted by the
instrument creating the trust or authority conferred on the fiduciary by
Court order or statute, a fiduciary has no power to invest the funds
in the stock of a private corporation."'" It would seem that this is all
that was necessary to decide the instant case and make it unnecessary
for the Court to re-interpret the statute.
The statute as it now stands with the interpretation of the Supreme
Court in the Strain case is mandatory," with investments outside the
legal list permitted if the will permits or with court approval. If this
interpretation prevails, will the trustee be protected by the mere fact
that he stays within the legal list? It would seem that this should follow
"
4 OHbO o.C. sec. 11214.
'a Home Savings and Loan Co. v. Strain et al., Trustees, supra, note 13, at page 5S.
" See SCOTT ON TRUSTS (1939) sec. 227. 13 n. z. But note, the present statute, OHo
G.C. sec. Io5o6-4i has not been interpreted on this point. The new statute is considerably
more extensive in scope and does not contain the phrase which the Court used to make the
former statute mandatory. Many lower court opinions contain dicta to this effect. See,
Shick v. Kroeger, zz Ohio L. Abs. 389 (1936) 5 Witmeyer v. Sheets, z4- Ohio L. Abs. 59,
64, 66 (1937).
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and there are some dicta in Ohio cases which could be so interpreted.'
However, this has not been the interpretation placed on these statutes,
although the courts are reluctant to surcharge the trustee if he has
stayed within the legal list." The trustee must still exercise his own
judgment and discretion and he is not absolved from the duty of
exercising reasonable care." It is quite possible that many of the security
categories listed would include permitted securities which if purchased
by a trustee would constitute gross abuse of his discretion and a breach
of trust.20 Also, the duty of determining whether a bond or mortgage
is within any of the categories contemplated by the statute is still placed
on the trustee. 2'
In conclusion, it is submitted that the true interpretation should
emphasize the permissive nature of the statute set out in the words "may
invest;" 2 that the purpose of the legislature, was to set a standard of
permissible investments for trustees and did not intend to exclude all
others; that the list set out provides a protection for the trustee and
a presumpion of reasonable diligence and good faith if he follows it;
that the clause"5 used by the Court in the Strain case in reaching the
mandatory result is inserted for the purpose of extending this protection
to non-legals approved by the court. Finally it is suggested that it is not
wise public policy to have a mandatory trust investment statute in these
days of questionable financing, both public and private, and that it would
be better to permit a trustee to purchase a good security wherever found.
J.W.L.
"Is Re Trusteeship of Trischer, 46 Ohio App. 405, 15 Ohio L. Abs. 54, 39 Ohio
L. Rep. 451, 88 N.E. 876 (1933)- Willis v. Braucher, 79 Ohio St. 290, 298 " . .. it
points out a course free course from risk and affords a certain sure method by which the
tru,,tee may secure an affirmation of the legality of his investment in advance."
-'Legal Lists in Trust Investment (1940), 49 YALE L.. 89 1, 895.
s'Delafleld v. Barrett et al., 27o N.Y. 43, 2oo N.E. 67, 103 A.L.R. 441 ('936).
ALo see, Matter of Jacobs, 152 Misc. 139, 273 N.Y.S. 279 "The effect of the statute is
not to excuse the fiduciary in case of loss where he invests in securities of the permitted
clases without proper investigation and the exercise of reasonable care . . . ." Also see,
z Scorr o5 TRUsTr (1939) sec. 227, 12.
M unicipal bonds are in the permitted class in Ohio if the city has not defaulted on
it" obligations for more than one hundred and twenty days in the previous ten years. The
bonds of American municipalities are at the present time notorious as a poor financial risk
v hen considered as a class. An investment by a trustee in such obligations, completely
fulfilling the terms of the statute could, even so, be a breach of duty.
Sufra, note S.
- As a general proposition when a legislature uses the word "may," such use connotes
discretion. If a mandatory interpretation is desired "shall" is used.
'Supra, note 14.
